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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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Executive Registry

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4 MAR 1977

Admiral Stansfield Turner  
Director of Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

On 19 January 1977, the Secretary of Defense requested your assistance in an effort being undertaken within the Department of Defense to enhance our understanding of the threat to the survivability and security of Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF) in order to reduce those vulnerabilities. Your specific assistance was requested in the development of a complete description of the threat to our Theater Nuclear Forces.

Pursuant to this tasking, the Secretary established a steering group consisting of selected members from both DOD and non-DOD agencies to provide direct participation and the necessary support assistance. As the designated chairman, I would like to convene the first meeting of this steering group on Tuesday, 15 March 1977 at 1000 in my office, Room 3E1074. It is my intention that this first meeting be of a general nature, providing members with the basic objectives of this survivability and security effort and the general substance of the DNA program at its current stage of development. Detailed review of the program and full discussions of the funding issue will be agenda items for the second steering group meeting.

The primary agenda item will be a briefing by the Director, DNA covering the following:

- Brief background leading to the program . . .
- Basic objectives for TNF survivability and security
- Outline of DNA proposed program
- Topics for follow-on discussions

I have attached a summary of the proposed program which should provide you with the general thrust and scope of the TNF survivability and security

effort. The point of contact on my staff for any questions you may have concerning our initial meeting is Colonel Ed Palanek, extension 55240.

*for* *William S. Maxson*  
D. R. Cotter  
Assistant to the Secretary  
of Defense (Atomic Energy)

Attachment  
a/s

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PLAN FOR CONTROL, SURVIVABILITY AND  
SECURITY OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES (TNF)

A. OVERVIEW

Theater conventional and nuclear forces play and will continue to play an increasingly important role in our overall deterrent posture. The survivability and security of these forces need improvement however, because of the much improved capability of Soviet forces intended for use in regional conflicts. These improved Soviet capabilities have occurred in their conventional, electronic warfare, unconventional, chemical and nuclear forces and in the control systems used by Soviet commanders to command these forces. To maintain an effective deterrent, the U.S. must reduce the vulnerability of its theater nuclear forces and the means for controlling them, to possible attacks from presently deployed Soviet forces and from those expected in the future.

In addition to the continued review and updating of operational plans, the several methods that are needed for increasing the control, survivability and security of the TNF should come from a continuing research, assessment, evaluation and test program. With the results of this work, improvements can be made in existing forces and deployments, and criteria established for future systems. The program will be a continuing effort ensuring that not only present problems in procedures, logistics, control and communications, and hardware are identified and corrected, but also that possible future problems are identified and eliminated.

A major task will be an evaluation of the current status of the survivability and security of existing storage sites, weapons, forces and control systems.

The principle parts of the program to improve U.S. theater deterrent nuclear forces are:

- o Determine alternative means and costs for providing a survivable control and communications system for theater nuclear forces against current and expected threats.
- o Determine alternative means and costs for increasing the survivability of present and future land, sea, and air components of U.S. Theater Nuclear Forces against current and expected threats.

- o Determine alternative means and costs for improving the security of nuclear weapons transported and stored outside the United States against all expected threats in the various conditions from peace through all types of war.

All technologies, systems and procedures identified for improving the control, security and survivability of theater forces will be subjected to verification in a test program prior to any implementation. This test verification and evaluation program will undergo periodic revision and will be applied to existing and future theater forces, storage sites and control systems.

All portions of this program will be pursued under the general constraint of improving the responsiveness and effectiveness of theater nuclear forces.

#### B. METHOD OF APPROACH

A three phase effort is envisioned and shown in the attached chart.

##### 1. Phase I: Concept Definition

During this initial phase, an assessment will be made of the existing U.S./NATO TNF after being subjected to various Soviet/WP threats or terrorist actions.

In addition, weapons systems in the development phase will be evaluated to establish their survivability and security against hostile actions. The results of these efforts will define the objectives and approached that a test program must achieve to establish the credibility of these assessments.

##### 2. Phase II: Research and Development

The primary thrust of this phase will be a proof-of-principle test program. Definition and implementation of test techniques against selected system(s) will be achieved. Concurrently, analytic methodologies will be applied and/or developed to extrapolate test data to other threats, situations, locations, etc.

Finally, existing technology which will permit near-term improvements to the control, survivability and security of TNF will be recommended.

### 3. Phase III: Implementation Phase

During the implementation phase, test techniques proven to be pertinent in the R&D phase will be conducted. At European and/or U.S. sites, data will be gathered under near-operational conditions. This information coupled with proven evaluating techniques will allow for a thorough assessment of the control, survivability and security of TNF. Those vulnerabilities needing long-term development programs will become evident. Throughout the programs, tests and methodologies for assessing TNF postures as well as procedures and hardware for improving this posture will be identified and made available to U.S. and Allied Forces.

PROGRAM FOR IMPROVEMENT  
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 OF  
CONTROL, SURVIVABILITY AND SECURITY OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES (TNF)

	PHASES		
	CONCEPT DEFINITION	DEVELOPMENT	IMPLEMENTATION
ASSESSMENT, EVALUATION AND RESEARCH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DEFINE AND DESCRIBE - FORCES, DEPLOYMENTS, AND CONTROL &amp; COMMUNICATIONS - ALTERNATE THREATS</li> <li>• PERFORM NET ASSESSMENT (NA) US/NATO vs SOV/WP</li> <li>• DEFINE OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH FOR TEST PROGRAMS AND MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOE's)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UPDATE PREVIOUS ELEMENTS</li> <li>• UPDATE NA</li> <li>• DEVELOP METHODOLOGIES &amp; ALTERNATE APPROACHES: REFINE MOE's</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CONTINUE UPDATE &amp; REFINEMENT</li> <li>• UPDATE NA</li> <li>• EXTEND TESTS, ETC. APPLY AND APPROVE MOE's</li> </ul>
TECHNOLOGY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DEFINE CURRENT AND PLANNED WPNS AND SECURITY R&amp;D</li> <li>• DEFINE SURVIVABILITY &amp; PHYSICAL SECURITY EFFORTS</li> <li>• DEFINE CONTROL &amp; COMMO PROCEDURES &amp; HARDWARE</li> <li>• DEFINE DECEPTION, CAMOUFLAGE, ETC. PROGRAMS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• INITIATE NEAR TERM IMPROVEMENTS</li> <li>• PROOF OF PRINCIPLE TEST</li> <li>• START LONG TERM</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• APPLY PROVEN TECHNOLOGIES</li> <li>• CONTINUE LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM</li> </ul>
SURVIVABILITY AND SECURITY TEST PROGRAM (SSTP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DEFINE DETAILED SSTP APPROACH</li> <li>• INSTRUMENTATION</li> <li>• TEST EQUIPMENT</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DEVELOP AND DEMONSTRATE (THROUGH PROOF OF PRINCIPLE TEST) THE SSTP CAPABILITY FOR SELECTED SYSTEM(S)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• APPLICATION OF SSTP CAPABILITY TO SELECTED SYSTEMS IN-THEATER/U.S.</li> </ul>

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12	Compt				
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19	DCI/SS				
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